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I. Introduction 
After decades of near total deference to Agency discretion, in United States v. Caronia, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2
nd
 Circuit applied first amendment doctrine and concluded 
that the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulation of off-label promotion of approved 
drug products unconstitutionally restricted pharmaceutical manufacturers’ freedom of speech.1 
The court got it wrong. Regulation of off-label promotion by drug manufacturers is essential to 
maintaining the effectiveness of the prior-approval drug regulatory system which is the backbone 
of FDA’s ability to protect the public, incentivize research, and provide the public with science 
based, accurate, and reliable information. Pharmaceutical companies should be prohibited from 
promoting off-label claims. Restriction of off-label promotion comports with congressional 
intent, FDA mission, and sound public health policy. Despite recent judicial activism, this 
enforcement tool should not be diluted.  
Nonetheless, there are potentially significant reasons to consider allowing manufacturers 
to engage in off-label promotion. Physician prescribing of off-label uses is common practice, is 
not illegal, and is necessary to meet the standard of care in certain therapeutic areas. In addition, 
Medicare allows reimbursement for essential uses of drugs which are off-label as long as they 
have been published in official compendia, even though they have not been approved through the 
NDA process.
2
 So, when an off-label use has been so established as to become the standard of 
care, why shouldn’t pharmaceutical companies be allowed to promote it? It is undeniable that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have a First Amendment protected right to freedom of speech but 
public health policy requires that we override that right to ensure the greater good of protecting 
the health and safety of the public.  
                                                            
1 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
2 42  U.S.C. § 1396(r) – 8(k)(6). 
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This article explores statutory construction, legislative intent, case law, and public health 
policy in concluding that the answer to the dilemma of off-label promotion is not to reverse 
course and provide what essentially amounts to an exclusion for pharmaceutical manufacturers 
from the requirement to prove safety and efficacy of drugs prior to marketing. The answer is for 
manufacturers to embrace options the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and FDA 
Guidance already provide for relying on less than usual access to clinical data or detailed study 
reports, or on studies with alternative, less intensive quality control/on-site monitoring, to gain 
approval for off-label uses. This will advance greater visibility of the use and provide objective, 
science-based, reliable information to doctors and patients at point of use in the approved 
labeling where it will do most good. 
II. The Prior-Approval Drug Regulatory System  
In 1930 Congress created the FDA and authorized them to enforce the Pure Food and 
Drugs Act of 1906.
3
  Prior to this enabling Act there was minimal regulation of the 
pharmaceutical industry and no requirement for determining the safety or efficacy of drug 
products before introducing them into interstate commerce.
4
 Consequently, the market was 
flooded with “snake oils” which at best perpetrated fraud on the public and at worst caused 
serious adverse events and death.
5
 It wasn’t until the “Elixir of Sulfanilamide” poisonings of 
1937 which killed 107 people, many of them children, from use of a cough syrup formulated 
with a deadly industrial solvent, that safety standards were adopted for all human drugs.
6
 This 
tragedy prompted the passage of the FDCA of 1938 requiring safety testing of all human drugs 
                                                            
3 Brochure: The History of Drug Regulation in the United States; 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/FOrgsHistory/CDER/CenterforDrugEvaluationandRe
searchBrochureandChronology/ucm114470.htm. 
4 “Milestones in Food and Drug Law History” 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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prior to marketing.
7
 While a step in the right direction, the near approval of thalidomide (which 
caused birth defects in thousands of children in Germany and England) in the U.S. led to the 
enactment of the 1962 amendments which strengthened the safety requirements and added the 
requirement for efficacy testing before marketing.
8
  
Pursuant to the FDCA, the FDA devised and implemented a system designed to ensure 
drugs are proven safe and effective before being put into interstate commerce.
9
 The backbone of 
the prior-approval system of drug regulation is the Investigational New Drug (IND) and New 
Drug Application (NDA) regulations which require that pharmaceutical manufacturing 
companies establish the safety and efficacy of new drug products through a rigorous program of 
in in-vitro, pre-clinical in-vivo (animal), and clinical (human) studies.
10,11
 These include 
toxicology, pharmacology, and drug-drug interaction studies, for example, to establish the risk-
benefit profile of a drug product for its intended use.
12
  The IND/NDA process facilitates the 
early identification of drugs that aren’t safe and effective and ensures that they do not get to 
market. For example, in 2003, Glaxo-Smithkline halted a clinical trial on the safety and efficacy 
of long acting beta agonists because a statistically significant number of patients on the drug died 
from asthma related deaths.
13
  
The FDCA prohibits manufacturers from marketing drugs which have not been deemed 
safe and effective through the NDA prior-approval process.
14
 Pursuant to the FDCA, to support 
                                                            
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 21 CFR § 312; 21 CFR § 314. 
10 Id., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act  § 505 (21 U.S.C. § 355). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 United States ‘Complaint at 44, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline, no. 11-10398-RWZ (D. Mass. Oct.26, 
2011). 
14 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 301(d), 505(a) [21 U.S .C . §§ 331(d), 355(a)]. 
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approval, an NDA must include “adequate data and information on the drug’s safety” and 
“substantial evidence of effectiveness.”15 The FDCA mandates the submission of full reports of 
investigations to meet these requirements. Depending on the type of data however, a 
manufacturer may chose to file their request for approval of a new drug under either a 505(b)(1) 
application or a 505(b)(2) application.
16
 A 505(b)(1) application includes full reports of 
investigations sponsored by the applicant along with the actual data supporting safety and 
effectiveness.
17
 A 505(b)(2) application includes full reports of investigations that are not 
sponsored by the applicant but are provided by reference to data generated by someone else.
18
 
For example, published literature reports may be used in a 505(b)(2) application to support safety 
and efficacy.
19
  
An applicant may also gain approval for a new indication, or different manner of use, for 
an already approved drug product through the Supplemental New Drug Application (SNDA) 
process.
20
 Much of the data supporting approval of a SNDA may be included by reference to the 
data submitted in the original NDA and only data and information about the new indication or 
manner of use need be generated and included.
21
   
When approval for a new indication or different manner of use for an already approved 
drug product is not sought, information about those potentially beneficial uses is disseminated to 
the medical community by inclusion in compendia, journal articles, and textbooks.
22
 These uses 
                                                            
15 Id. 
16Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §505(b)(1) [21 U.S.C § 505(b)(1)]. 
17 Id. 
18 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §505(b)(2) [21 U.S.C § 505(b)(2)]. 
19 Id. 
20 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 
21 Id. 
22 “Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999. 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm 
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are also disseminated via discussion at independent symposia, educational sessions, and 
professional meetings.
23
 Finally, knowledge about these uses is spread by off-label promotion.
24
 
It has been suggested that dissemination via compendia, journal articles, textbooks independent 
symposia, educational sessions, and professional meetings are better than relying on 
manufacturer’s off-label promotion for a variety of reasons and FDA in fact prohibits 
dissemination by off-label promotion.
25
 Post NDA approval, advertising and promotion of an 
approved drug product for a use that is not identical to that in an effective (i.e. approved) NDA 
undermines the prior-approval drug regulatory scheme because the safety and efficacy of the off-
label use has not been established through the rigorous process established by the FDA pursuant 
to the FDCA.  
Recognizing the need for oversight of manufacturers’ off-label promotion activities, 
Congress amended the FDCA Act in 1962 and gave FDA the authority to regulate the 
advertising and promotion of prescription drug products as well.
26
 This was a response, in part, 
to Congressional concerns that doctors could not adequately evaluate frequently misleading 
claims by drug manufacturers without a body of objective, reliable information.
27
 Pursuant to 
this authority, FDA provided criteria for appropriate advertising and promotion and prohibited 
the advertising and promotion of drugs for any use other than that subject to an effective NDA.
28
 
                                                            
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Guidance for Industry: Responding to Unsolicited requests for Off-Label Information about 
Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices; Draft 2011 at 2. 
26 “Milestones in Food and Drug Law History” 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm. 
27 “Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A.,FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999. 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm. 
28 21 CFR § 201, 21 CFR § 202. 
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Advertising violates the FDCA if it is false or misleading, fails to provide fair balance, and/or 
fails to reveal material facts.
29
  
Off-label promotion is the promotion of a drug for a use or uses that have not been 
approved by the FDA as safe and effective. These may include, for example, claims for the use 
of a drug to treat a different condition, to treat a different population of patients, or to be used 
according to a different dosing regimen. To ensure successful patient outcomes, advertising and 
promotional material must accurately state what condition the drug is approved for and how to 
use it correctly. The safety and efficacy of use for any other condition or in any other way is 
unknown and puts the public at risk. 
FDA’s mission is not limited to protecting the public health by assuring the safety and 
efficacy of drugs.
30
 It is also to advance the public health by speeding innovations that make 
medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable.
31
  Moreover, it aims to help the public 
obtain accurate, science-based information they need to use drugs effectively.
32
 Prohibiting drug 
manufacturers’ off-label promotion is essential to achieving each of these three goals. It ensures 
the integrity and effectiveness of the prior-approval drug regulatory system which is the 
backbone of the FDA’s ability to protect the public by keeping unsafe and ineffective drugs off 
the market; advances the public health by incentivizing the generation of accurate science-based 
information on safety and efficacy, and helps patients get the accurate, science-based information 
they need to use drugs to maintain and improve their health.
33
  
                                                            
29 Id. 
30 Statement of FDA Mission; 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM29833
1.pdf. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 “Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999. 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm 
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III. Public Health Policy 
Public health policy suggests that off-label promotion be regulated to ensure viability of 
the prior-approval drug regulatory system. When the prior-approval drug regulatory system is 
circumvented and manufacturers are allowed to advertise and promote at will, human tragedy 
often ensues. Based on the amount of money the pharmaceutical industry expends on promotion 
and advertising, it’s undisputed that promotion and advertising are extremely effective vehicles 
for increasing the use of drug products.
34
 
The global tobacco epidemic is a direct result of circumventing the prior-approval drug 
regulatory system and allowing advertising and promotion to go unregulated. Based on the 
FDCA, the FDA defines the term “drug” as articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, and articles intended to affect the structure or 
function of the body. It defines “new drugs” as any drug not generally recognized among 
qualified experts as safe and effective and subjects them to the prior-approval requirements of 
the FDCA.
35
 Even though Tobacco companies strategically don’t make drug claims for their 
products today, they have long touted a variety of health claims and disease states treated by 
smoking. Early ads included claims for weight loss (“To Keep a Slender Figure”), as well as 
asthma and other diseases of the mouth, throat, and lungs (Dr. Batty’s).36,37 Many ads indirectly 
promoted the benefits of smoking by featuring doctors (“More Doctors Smoke Camels”).38 
                                                            
34Big Pharma Spends More On Advertising Than Research And Development, Study Finds, Jan.7, 2008 
 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080105140107.htm. 
35 21 U.S.C § 201(g)(1) 
36 “When smoking was good for you! Advertisers used to claim cigarettes would keep women slim and 
beautiful”; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2107969/When-smoking-good-Advertisers-used-
claim-cigarettes-women-slim.html#ixzz2QU21DZmJ 
37Advertisement:  “Dr. Batty’s For Your Health Asthma Cigarettes”  
38 Advertisement: “More Doctors Smoke Camels” 
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Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that tobacco products affect the structure or function of the 
body.
39
 Thus, tobacco products should have fallen under the rubric of the FDCA of 1938. Even 
though the Court in Brown & Williamson concluded that tobacco is not a drug, and thus not 
subject to the FDCA, Congress subsequently passed the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act (TCA) granting FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products.
40,41
 This 
authority covers the content, marketing and sale of tobacco products and requires manufacturers 
to seek approval for any new tobacco products.
42
 From that standpoint, the TCA is remarkably 
similar in scope to the FDCA. Global consumption of cigarettes has risen steadily since they 
were introduced at the beginning of the 20
th
 Century.
43
 Scientific evidence has shown that all 
forms of tobacco cause health problems which frequently result in death or disability and no 
other consumer product is as dangerous or deadly.
44
 The global tobacco epidemic is a clear 
example of the result that ensues when the prior-approval drug regulatory system is 
circumvented and advertising and promotion goes unregulated. Had Congress and the Courts 
accepted tobacco products as drugs and subjected them to FDA regulation sooner, this massive 
public health tragedy would have been averted because tobacco product manufacturers would 
have had to provide adequate data and information on their products’ safety.  This data readily 
would have revealed the dangerous side effects from use of tobacco products and led to their 
prohibition. 
                                                            
39 Knut-Olaf Haustein, Tobacco or Health?: Physiological and Social Damages Caused by Tobacco 
Smoking; (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York) 2001. 
40 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
41 P.L. 111-31 (2009); 21 U.S.C. 301.  
42 Id. 
43 Dr. Judith Mackay, Dr. Mihael Eriksen, The Tobacco Atlas (World Health Organization) 2002. 
44 Id. 
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A number of other off-label drug uses have resulted in tragic consequences from 
circumventing the prior-approval drug regulatory system.
45
 These include off-label use of drugs 
to treat AIDS, life threatening arrhythmias, angina and hypertension, and post operative pain.
46
  
In a desperate attempt to stem the AIDS epidemic, the drug ddC was manufactured, sold 
and used before clinical trials were conducted to assess its safety and efficacy. The studies 
revealed that those using ddC as initial therapy had a death rate at least twice as high as patients 
on AZT, the drug already approved for the treatment of AIDS.
47
  
In another example, the drugs encainide and flecainide were used off-label to prevent 
increased mortality of heart attack victims who had high levels of ventricular premature 
complexes.
48
 Although the use was unstudied and unapproved it was supported in some 
published peer-reviewed journal articles.
49
 When the value of this therapy began to be suspected, 
the National Institutes of Health conducted clinical studies and discovered that the death rate of 
patients on the combination was more than twice the rate of patients on placebo.
50
  
Another example includes the widespread off-label use of calcium channel blockers, 
instead of beta blockers, in post-heart attack patients which was fostered by publications that 
could be interpreted as supportive.
51
 Instead of helping, this off-label use likely cost thousands of 
lives each year.
52
 
                                                            
45 “Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999. 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 “Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999. 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm. 
52 Id. 
10 
 
A final example is the risk of serious, life-threatening, respiratory depression associated 
with the off-label use of the fentanyl patch for post-operative pain which was based on a number 
of publications describing the patch as safe and effect for that use.
53
  Without a comprehensive 
review of these publications and any other data available, it is unclear whether these publications 
would have been adequate in terms of quantity and quality to support FDA approval of this 
indication. For sure though, we would know the answer to that question had the manufacturer 
collected the data available and submitted it to the FDA for review. Without this no one would 
be able to say how much more data, if any, would be needed to support or dispute the safety and 
efficacy of this off-label use.  
In sum, protection of off-label promotion as a first amendment right circumvents the 
NDA prior-approval process and exposes patients to treatments which have not been vetted 
through the NDA prior-approval process. This brings us full circle back to pre-1906 when drugs 
were considered commodities and sold as any other commercial good. History has shown this 
results in human tragedy. These tragedies trumpet that from a public policy standpoint, society’s 
right to freedom from unsafe or ineffective drugs must trump manufacturer’s right to free speech.  
IV. Freedom of Speech 
In United States v. Caronia, a sales representative responsible for detailing the drug 
Xyrem
®
 to physicians for cataplexy (weak or paralyzed muscles caused by narcolepsy) promoted 
the drug for insomnia, fibromyalgia, restless leg syndrome, Parkinson’s disease and Multiple 
Sclerosis as well.
54
 The FDA charged Caronia with intent to introduce a misbranded drug into 
interstate commerce (because it lacked adequate directions for its off-label intended use) but the 
                                                            
53 Id. 
54 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012) 
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court decided he was being prosecuted for his speech in violation of the First Amendment and 
applied First Amendment doctrine instead.
55
 
A.  First Amendment Doctrine & Caronia Analysis 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress from making any law 
that abridges the freedom of speech.
56
 While bribery, perjury, and anti-trust conspiracies are not 
protected, and political speech is well protected, commercial speech has historically been less 
protected allowing some restrictions to be deemed constitutional.
57
 It was not until Central 
Hudson was decided in 1980 that commercial speech first received First Amendment 
protection.
58
 In Central Hudson, commercial speech was analyzed under a heightened scrutiny 
standard.
59
 Subsequent to Central Hudson, in 1985, Zauderer was decided which provides for 
some types of commercial speech to be analyzed pursuant to a normal scrutiny standard.
60
 
Under normal scrutiny, the Zauderer Test (rational basis) is applied.
61
 To survive a 
constitutional challenge under Zauderer, the speech must be purely factual and uncontroversial, 
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception, and not unjustified or unduly 
burdensome.
62
 Zauderer applies to speech which the government forces a company to make in 
order to prevent deception  as is the case with certain required warnings and disclosures.
63
 The 
Court in Caronia did not apply Zauderer because the speech restricted was voluntary commercial 
                                                            
55 Id. 
56 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
57 Ralph F. Hall, FDA, Caronia and the 1st Amendment, FDLI Annual Conference 2013; 
http://www.fdli.org/docs/default-document-library/hall_2013new.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
58 Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. 557. 
59 Id. 
60 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626. 
61 R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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speech. One could well posit that the failure to include adequate directions for its off-label 
intended use amounted to the failure to make a disclosure compelled by law and thus apply 
Zauderer but the Court did not do so in this case.
64
 
Under heightened scrutiny, either the Central Hudson Test or the Strict Scrutiny Test is 
applied.
65
 Pursuant to Central Hudson, to determine if the speech deserves protection, the speech 
must not be misleading or about an illegal activity, and the government must prove that its 
asserted interest is substantial, the restriction directly and materially advances the states’ interest, 
and the restriction is narrowly tailored.
66
 To survive a constitutional challenge under Strict 
Scrutiny, the government must prove that their interest is compelling, the restricted speech is 
vital to advancing their interest, and the restriction is narrowly tailored.
67
 Voluntary commercial 
speech is typically analyzed under heightened scrutiny.
68
 
In analyzing Caronia, the Court followed the First Amendment analysis and decision in 
Sorrell V. IMS Health.
69
 In SorrelI, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that speech in aid of 
pharmaceutical marketing is a form of free expression protected by the First Amendment.
70
 
Sorrell stands for the premise that a law which imposes a restriction on content and speaker 
based speech that is subject to heightened scrutiny is presumed invalid unless it is justified in 
light of a substantial government interest.
71
 The Caronia panel found the speech was content 
based because it permitted on-label promotion but prohibited off-label promotion, and speaker 
                                                            
64 Frank Pasquale, Seton Hall Law AWR Comments, Spring 2013. 
65 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (Foundation Press) 2010. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Sorrell v IMS Health, Inc., 131 S.Ct.2653 (2011). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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based because it applied only to pharmaceutical companies and not to doctors or anyone else.
72
 
Because the restricted speech was voluntary commercial speech the Court applied heightened 
scrutiny. Using the Central Hudson test, they found that the restriction did not meet the third (the 
restriction must advance a substantial government interest) or fourth prong (the restriction must 
be narrowly tailored) and concluded that FDA’s restriction of pharmaceutical manufacturers’ 
off-label promotion speech was unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.
73
 
Paramount to this finding, however, is the assumption made by the court a priori that the speech 
was truthful.  
B. The Sorrell Analysis  
Before getting to the Sorrell analysis, it’s important to note, that the Court in Caronia did 
not address certain critical issues before applying First Amendment doctrine. First, the court 
decided that Caronia was prosecuted for his speech, but the charge was misbranding, and his 
speech was only used as evidence to prove misbranding (intent to ship a misbranded drug in 
interstate commerce.)
74
 Under the FDCA, a drug is misbranded if it lacks adequate directions for 
lay use.
75
  By definition, the legal status of a drug is “over-the-counter” unless it is impossible 
for adequate directions for lay use to be created.
76
 When it is impossible to create adequate 
directions for lay use, the legal status is “prescription” and it is exempted from the requirements 
for adequate directions as long as the intended use is the same as that approved in an NDA.
77
 
                                                            
72 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012). 
73 Id. 
74 Id, Dissent at 172. 
75 21 C.F.R. § 352. 
76 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 503(b)(1) [21 USC § 353(b)(1)]. 
77 Id. 
14 
 
Thus, a drug is misbranded if it is labeled, advertised, or promoted for a use that is not the same 
as the labeling in the approved NDA.
78
  
In Sorrell, Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law was challenged and found to have 
unconstitutionally burdened the speech of pharmaceutical marketers and data miners without 
adequate justification.
79
 With the goal of protecting patient privacy, this law prohibited 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from using prescriber-identifying information for marketing 
purposes.
80
 In Sorrell the law was discriminatory because it only restricted manufacturers’ use of 
the data while others were allowed to use the data even though they too could compromise 
patient privacy.
81
 
Sorrell is distinguishable from Caronia because in Sorrell, the VT law that restricted use 
of prescriber-identifiable data in promotional activities by pharmaceutical manufacturers targeted 
speech directly.
82
 In Caronia, the conviction was based on the use of speech as evidence to prove 
intended use which does not even implicate the First Amendment. Thus, First Amendment 
doctrine should not have been applied at all.
83
   
 The Caronia Panel also based its conclusion on a characterization of the restricted speech 
as speaker and content based.
84
 The speech, however, was not content based because off-label 
                                                            
78 Pursuant to section 503(b)(1) of the Act, [21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)], a prescription drug is not safe for use 
except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug. By definition, a 
prescription drug's directions for use are not adequate to enable a layperson to safely use the drug for 
its intended uses. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.5. Consequently, failing to bear adequate directions for use 
pursuant to section 502(f)(1) of the Act, [21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1)] and lacking  an approved application, the 
drug not exempt from 21 C. F.R. § 201.115 and is therefore misbranded. 
79 Sorrell v IMS Health, Inc., 131 S.Ct.2653 (2011). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012). 
84 Id. 
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promotion is restricted for all drugs, not just particular drugs, and it was not speaker based 
because off-label promotion is restricted for all manufacturers, not just particular manufacturers. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are the only actors that FDA regulates so it’s incorrect to conclude 
that they were discriminated against while doctors were not because doctors aren’t in the 
universe of actors regulated by FDA.  
Nonetheless, pursuant to the Sorrell analysis, the court concluded that the law restricting 
off-label was presumptively invalid and it looked to the Central Hudson Test to determine if was 
justified in light of the government interest involved.
85
 Pursuant to Caronia, the test for 
justifying the restriction of commercial speech in the food and drug law realm now appears to be 
a sequential Sorrell – Central Hudson Test. 
 C. The Central Hudson Test Analysis 
Under the Central Hudson test, to be protected, the speech must be truthful, not 
misleading, and not about an illegal activity. If the speech is protected, a restriction is justified 
only if it supports a substantial government interest, directly advances that interest to a material 
degree, and is narrowly drawn and not more extensive than needed.
86
  
1. The First Prong 
Applying the first prong of the Central Hudson Test we find there is no question that the 
activity promoted, off-label drug use, is not illegal (doctors can prescribe off-label uses of drugs 
for patients under their care and patients can use drugs off-label). Off-label promotion, however, 
is inherently misleading. Off-label promotion implies that a drug is safe and effective for a 
                                                            
85 Id. 
86Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. 557. 
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particular use when the pharmaceutical manufacturer doesn’t really know.  While the 
promotional information may be true, and the use truly safe and effective, by statutory definition, 
the speech is misleading because the use hasn’t been proven safe and effective according the 
criteria set out in the FDCA. Thus, doctors may be relying on misleading information when they 
conclude that an off-label use is safe and effective enough to prescribe to their patients. Pursuant 
to the statute, safe and effective means that 1) the use is subject to an effective NDA; 2) the NDA 
includes full reports of investigations containing “adequate data and information” on the drugs’ 
safety and “substantial evidence” of effectiveness (for that use), 3) the data and information was 
assessed by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and 
effectiveness of the drug for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested, 4) 
the benefit of the drug use was determined to be greater than the risk, and 5) labeling is available 
(for that use) which is “adequate” to explain what the drug is intended for and the risks and 
benefits of using it for that condition.
87
 Thus, for an off-label use, where the manufacturer hasn’t 
meet the statutory requirements for deeming it safe and effective, the speech is inherently 
misleading and it must fail the first prong of the Central Hudson Test. This means that the speech 
is not protected under the Constitution and the government can restrict it without scrutiny. 
Congress expressly defined safety and effectiveness in the FDCA.
88
  They recognized that no 
drug is ever one hundred percent safe and effective, and thus set the standard for safety and 
effectiveness based on scientific evidence. Had Congress wanted to leave the standard for 
determining the safety and efficacy of drugs up to manufacturers, they would not have expressly 
defined it, and would not have authorized FDA to enforce it. 
                                                            
87 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic  Act § 505 (21 U.S.C. § 355).  
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Nonetheless, the court in Caronia assumed the speech was truthful (in part, because the 
government did not make the assertion that it was not.)
89
 The Court stated that, prohibiting off-
label promotion “paternalistically interferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive 
potentially relevant treatment information” and thereby “could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, 
informed and intelligent treatment decisions.”90 To the contrary, banning off-label promotion 
prevents doctors and patients from being mislead with potentially false information. The court 
also claimed that the FDCA contemplated off-label drug use.
91
 This may be true but the FDCA 
most likely did not contemplate off-label promotion, or that manufacturers would circumvent the 
system by promoting off-label uses without going through the approval system. It’s fair to say 
that Congress presupposed that manufacturers would follow the process lest they wouldn’t have 
legislated it and authorized FDA to enforce it. 
2. The Second Prong 
The government’s substantial interest in prohibiting off-label promotion is self-evident 
and the Court easily established that the second prong was satisfied. They found the government 
did have a substantial interest in “preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug 
approval process, and an interest in reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.” 92 
3. The Third Prong 
Pursuant to the third prong of the Central Hudson test, the government may restrict 
speech if it directly advances their substantial interest to a material degree.
93
 The FDA has a 
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substantial interest in banning off-label promotion to achieve its tri-fold objectives: protect the 
public from harm from unsafe and ineffective drugs, advance the public health by supporting 
innovations that make medicines more effective, safer, and affordable, and help the public get 
accurate, science based information needed to use drugs successfully. Banning off-label 
promotion directly advances the Government’s interest in a material way because off-label 
promotion circumvents the prior-approval drug regulatory system which thereby 1) exposes 
patients to risk of harm from unsafe and ineffective drugs because FDA is robbed of the 
opportunity to keep unsafe drugs off the market; 2) suppresses innovation by allowing 
manufacturers to market drugs without first proving safety and efficacy thereby muting the 
incentive to generate accurate science based information and 3) prevents the public from get 
getting accurate, science base information because none will be generated.
94
 Without needing to 
file an NDA, manufacturers have no incentive to conduct innovative research. Without 
conducting research, manufacturers don’t have the information necessary for an adequate 
assessment of the drug’s safety and efficacy for the promoted off-label use. Without an objective 
assessment by qualified experts, the information provided by manufacturers cannot be complete, 
unbiased or reliable. Incomplete and biased information is inherently false and misleading. 
Without consequences for false and misleading promotion, companies have no incentive to 
conduct studies or collect otherwise available data and information (e.g. published literature), to 
submit to FDA to definitively establish the safety and efficacy an off-label use.  
To legally establish the safety and effectiveness of an off-label use, manufacturers must 
meet the FDCA definition of substantial evidence which FDA has clearly interpreted and 
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described in numerous regulation and guidance.
95,96
 Substantial evidence typically requires full 
investigations including two adequate and well controlled studies but in certain circumstances 
less evidence is acceptable.
97
 Without generating substantial evidence, manufacturers advance 
their own interests over that of the public. Off-label promoters have an inherent conflict of 
interest as their primary interest is investor return. Conducting full investigations of off-label 
uses is not in drug manufacturers’ best interest. To conduct these investigations, resources need 
to be diverted from the study of other drugs. Diverting these resources is not justified when there 
are no consequences for promoting and selling a drug for an off-label use without generating the 
data. Even worse, the studies may fail thus cutting off an otherwise available revenue stream. 
Likewise, compiling and assessing a comprehensive review of all of the data and information 
otherwise unimpeded (i.e. published literature) about an off-label use is also not in the 
company’s best interest.  Again, the assessment may reveal the drug is not safe or not effective. 
When pharmaceutical manufacturers can bypass the system and financially gain from off-label 
uses without doing the research, the cost and risk of doing research can’t be justified from a 
business perspective.  
If there were consequences for false and misleading promotion, drug manufacturers 
would conduct the studies or assessments needed. Positive results from these studies and 
assessments would support approvals through the NDA system while negative results would 
prevent promotion of those uses. In this way, and doctors and patients would get accurate science 
based information and patients would be protected from using drugs in ways that have not been 
shown to be safe and effective. 
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Nonetheless, the Court in Caronia found the restricted speech did not meet the third 
prong because it did not directly advance the government’s interest to a material degree.98 The 
court reasoned that because off-label use is allowed and the speech is truthful prohibiting 
manufacturers from promoting them doesn’t undermine the drug approval process nor help 
reduce exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.
99
 Had the truthfulness of off-label promotion 
been assessed in Caronia, the Court well may have found that off-label speech is not protected. 
In addition, the court said “criminalizing manufacturers’ promotion of off-label use while 
permitting others to promote such uses to doctors is an indirect and questionable effective means 
to achieve the goal of shepherding physicians to prescribe drugs only on-label.
100
 The court 
clearly misunderstands FDA’s goal in restricting off-label promotion. “Shepherding physicians 
to prescribe drugs only on-label” is not only not the objective, it’s contrary to FDA’s goal.  
FDA’s goal is to safeguarding the public, advancing the public health by encouraging innovation 
in medicine, and disseminating truthful information to patients. Understanding the goal is 
paramount to determining whether the means to achieve that goal is appropriate. Had the Court 
recognized the correct goal, they likely would have found the means acceptable. 
4. The Fourth Prong 
To meet the fourth prong of Central Hudson, the restriction cannot be more extensive 
than needed to advance the government policy.
101
 Banning of off-label promotion by 
manufacturers is not more extensive than needed because drug manufacturers are the only group 
restricted. Banning off-label speech across the board would be over inclusive, limit the free 
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exchange of information between doctors and educational institutions, and be a disservice to 
patients.
102
 Limiting the ban to drug manufacturers specifically targets the single group that has 
inordinate incentives for distortion if they don’t participate in it.103 FDA doesn’t regulate doctors 
or the public, they only regulate drug manufacturers.
104
 In addition, the regulations don’t 
discriminate among manufacturers (i.e. all manufacturers are banned alike). Sorrell is 
distinguishable because the law did not discriminate within the regulated universe of actors.
105
  
Even the court in Sorrell conceded that “the first amendment does not prevent restrictions 
directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech”.106   
The Caronia Court speculated that there are numerous less restrictive means available to 
meet the government’s goal.107 They suggested that if FDA is concerned that physicians may be 
deceived by off-label promotion, the agency “could guide physicians and patients in 
differentiating between misleading and false promotion, exaggerations and embellishments, and 
truthful or non-misleading information.”108 Given FDA’s resource constraints, it’s highly 
unlikely that this suggestion would be feasible, or effective.
109
 The Court rejected FDA’s defense 
that this and other means were not administrable, feasible, or effective and said that FDA must 
prove that they aren’t practical, effective, or feasible.110 Hasn’t history already proven this? The 
sulfanilamide and thalidomide tragedies and the global tobacco epidemic alone support the fact 
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that allowing circumvention of the prior-approval drug regulatory system and unregulated drug 
advertising and promotion do not achieve the goal of protecting the public from unsafe and 
ineffective drugs.
111
 Nonetheless, the Caronia Court found the prohibition of off-label promotion 
was more extensive than needed.
112
 Had the Court considered the realities of the FDA’s resource 
limitations and the fact that drug regulation and tragedy are inversely related, they would likely 
have concluded otherwise. 
In sum, it is undisputed that doctors are allowed to prescribe off-label uses under the 
auspices of the practice of medicine. This allows innovative medicine to quickly get to patients 
that need it without having to wait for full investigations and NDA approval. Awareness of off-
label uses is generated not only by off-label promotion but also by compendia, journal articles, 
textbooks, independent symposia, professional meetings.
113
 Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
contend that allowing off-label promotion serves doctors and their patients, and that government 
regulation should not impede the practice of medicine by restricting off-label promotion. Despite 
this noble endeavor pharmaceutical manufacturers have a conflict of interest. It is not FDA’s 
goal to prevent ill patients’ access to drugs114. FDA’s goal is to get objective, science-based, and 
reliable information about drugs to ill patients so they can use them successfully.
115
 Thus, despite 
the fact that First Amendment doctrine should not have been applied to this case at all, the 
Central Hudson test proves rather than denies that the restriction of off-label promotion is 
justified whether the speech is considered truthful or not. 
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V. Academia  
In a review entitled, “Off-Label Prescription Advertising, The FDA and the First 
Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection,” the authors Klasmeier 
and Redish conclude that FDA is clueless when it comes to the First Amendment and 
commercial speech rights.
116
 Klasmeier and Redish, fail to recognize and appreciate the position 
that the FDA is in. The FDCA and FDA’s mission require that FDA manage a delicate balance 
between protecting the public and enhancing activities that result in scientific findings and 
ensuring these scientific facts are disseminated truthfully, understandably, and without deception 
to those who need them. These objectives, in tension with each other, require a delicate balance. 
Klasmeier and Redish’s claim that, “FDA’s categorical prohibition of off-label use 
amounts to a classic suppression of commercial speech” may be true but the Supreme Court in 
Sorrell concedes that commercial speech may be restricted.
117
 Commercial speech is not and 
should not be afforded full protection like these authors promote. The Central Hudson Test 
provides the framework for the analysis to determine when commercial speech is being 
unconstitutionally suppressed and when it is not.
118
 In the context of public health and safety, 
suppression of off-label promotion is justified pursuant to Central Hudson.
119
 
The authors’ contend that “the government cannot suppress communication completely 
when the danger can be avoided by the provision of more information, rather than less” but they 
fail to appreciate the fact that neither the FDA nor the manufacturer has the information to 
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provide.
120
 If the manufacturer had adequate data and information on the safety, and substantial 
evidence of effectiveness, of the off-label use they would submit it to FDA for review and 
approval thereby getting the information on the drug label itself. Having the off-label use made 
on-label is far more valuable to manufacturers because the new use gets much more visibility 
and eliminates the expense of sales calls. In this way, when truly beneficial, the use is as 
transparent as the light of day for all doctors to see – it’s no longer limited to linear 
dissemination of the message from the sales rep to doctor 1, then from doctor 1 to doctor 2, etc., 
which suffers from the problem of gossip distortion as depicted in many comedic sketches of the 
20
th
 Century where the message at the end of the phone line is not the same as the message at the 
beginning. In this context though, distortion of the message is not funny. In other words, getting 
an off-label use on-label blasts it out of the dark ages into the new millennium of transparency 
with all the benefits that come along with that, like accuracy, completeness, and reliability of the 
message.  
The authors state that FDA could attempt to redefine its interest more narrowly to finesse 
the problems under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson. Again they fail to recognize 
that FDA’s mission, as directed by Congress, is three fold and narrowing their interest would 
require Congress to Amend the FDCA.
121
 
The authors state that it is impossible to assert that the public health and safety will be 
advanced by the categorical prohibition of off-label promotion because FDA allows off-label use 
yet bans off-label promotion which deprives ill patients of valuable and lawful treatments for the 
                                                            
120 Coleen Klasmeier, Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, The FDA and the First 
Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection; American Journal of Law and 
Medicine 2011. 
121 Id. 
25 
 
simple reason that their doctors are unaware of their existence.
122
 They suggest that the FDA 
cure their constitutional speech problem by prohibiting doctors from prescribing off-label use at 
all so that conduct instead of speech is targeted.
123
 The authors’ logic is flawed and they miss the 
point of FDA’s existence. A ban on off-label prescribing would completely deprive ill patients 
from potentially beneficial treatments whereas banning the promotion of off-label uses only 
shifts the speech from manufacturers who have inherent bias to independent medical and public 
health organizations. Again, the authors fail to appreciate the complexity of FDAs mandate: to 
prevent harm and advance health. Without undergoing rigorous scientific analysis and 
evaluation, even the FDA does not know which claim is truthful and beneficial, and which not, 
so from a public health standpoint they logically would not prevent the drug’s off-label use 
unless it were definitively proven that it was not truthful, and harmful. Thus, if FDA prevents 
off-label use, patients will suffer from lack of access to potentially valuable treatments, and if 
they don’t prevent off-label use, patients will suffer from exposure to potentially harmful 
treatments. Thus, either way you look at it patients suffer. From a public health ethics viewpoint, 
depriving all ill patients of potentially lifesaving treatments is far worse than depriving 
pharmaceutical manufacturers additional sales from off-label uses with an incidental burden on 
their freedom of speech. By not generating the scientific evidence required by law under the 
FDCA, pharmaceutical manufacturers have effectively forced FDA into the position of having to 
allow off-label use. The authors claim that FDA is extorting manufacturers into conducting 
studies when they have “absolutely no legal obligation to undertake such action” but that is 
absolutely untrue.
124
 They, in fact, absolutely do have a legal obligation under the FDCA § 
505(a) which states, “no person shall introduce into interstate commerce any new drug unless 
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approval of an application filed pursuant to section 505 subsection (b) of (j) is effective.”125 The 
law could not be clearer: before you can market a drug you must gain approval for it through the 
prior-approval drug regulatory scheme which means you must provide evidence of safety and 
effectiveness. To the contrary, pharmaceutical manufacturers are using the public health 
argument to advance their own interest to force the FDA to let them to promote their products 
without complying with the law. On the other hand, allowing doctors to prescribe off-label drug 
uses generates evidence, albeit weak, about uses that manufacturers refuse to study yet don’t 
refuse to profit from. 
Judge Louis Brandeis realized the benefit in allowing states the liberty to be “little 
laboratories” in applying policy that does not necessarily correspond with the government 
viewpoint, and so does FDA.
126
 Where manufacturers refuse to ensure the safety and efficacy of 
the drugs they promote, FDA allows individual doctors to engage in what essentially amounts to 
individual research thereby advancing the public interest and FDA’s mandate to advance the 
public health by encouraging innovation. If FDA were to ban off-label use, no innovation 
concerning off-label uses would occur at all because manufacturers aren’t studying them and 
doctors would not be able to experiment with them.  
The authors also claim that FDA’s categorical ban subsumes manufacturer promotion of 
uses that are not only accepted but universally recognized as extremely valuable to the 
preservation of public health.
127
 But this argument works both ways. FDA’s categorical ban not 
only subsumes the beneficial treatments but it also subsumes the harmful treatments. Without the 
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ability to separate the wheat from the chaff, FDA has no choice but to sweep up the good with 
the bad. Furthermore, uses that are accepted and universally recognized as beneficial would 
naturally have generated a plethora of evidence in the literature to support its approval and 
shouldn’t need to be promoted. In other words, if so valuable and well known, these off-label 
uses should sell themselves. If manufacturers feel the need to promote these uses, they should 
collect the data, submit it to the FDA and make the off-label use on-label. This is the win-win 
solution that is in the best interest of the public and industry: objective, reliable, science-based 
evidence on the label with full transparency so the risks and benefits can be accurately weighed, 
individually at point of use.  
The authors argue that FDA control of off-label use information is paternalistic and 
shows a lack of respect for the “citizenry’s ability to make lawful choices on the basis of truthful 
advocacy.”128 The authors fail to recognize that patients as well as their doctors are a vulnerable 
population. It’s incomprehensible to think desperately ill laypersons can rationally analyze the 
veracity of a manufacturer’s claim and that doctors, in their choice to prescribe an off-label use, 
do so based on the information given to them via a sales representative. Any off-label use is an 
experiment, conducted by a doctor based on a hypothesis generated by potentially accurate but 
often incomplete and unreliable off-label promotion information, and his own and other doctors 
experience, in what essentially amounts to a series of uncontrolled studies with an n-value of 
one. So, it’s a vulnerable population with high stakes that warrants additional protection.  
Finally, the authors claim that the FDA does not ban off-label prescribing of drugs 
simply because it is too inconvenient for them and “suppression of fully protected, potentially 
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valuable expression is far too high a price to pay for government convenience”.129 First, it’s 
highly debatable that this speech is, or even should be, fully protected, and second, the price that 
is too high to pay is for the patients who are deprived of objective, scientific based reliable 
information from which to make critical decisions affecting whether they will live or not, how 
long they will live, and what the quality of that experience will be. This, in contrast to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers who are deprived the ability to take advantage of ill patients’ 
desperate needs for cures with what amounts to the modern day version of quackery - the 
marketing and sale of a product without acceptable evidence for the efficacy and safety of 
whatever treatments, cures, regimens, or procedures are advocated, cloaked in a douse of fairy 
Godlobby dust. Congress recognized this fifty years ago when they passed the FDAC 
Amendments of 1962 based in part on reports that doctors could not adequately evaluate 
frequently misleading claims by drug manufacturers without a body of objective, reliable 
information.
130
 
The authors conclude that the FDA is using a hatchet to prevent all off-label promotion 
when they should be using a scalpel to dissect and separate truthful from untruthful claims 
thereby allowing them to prohibit only the untruthful claims.
131
 Well this is a job for Goliath. 
Separating the wheat from the chaff in this context requires the tool of scientific evidence. Who 
should pay for these tools - the U.S. taxpayers or the companies that stand to benefit from the 
sales of the truthful claims which FDA has dissected from the untruthful claims with the tools 
paid for by taxpayers? In any commercial world the burden is on the manufacturer to ensure their 
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products are safe and effective for any conceivable use of their product. Looking through the lens 
from FDA’s viewpoint, a ban on manufacturer’s off-label promotion is not bizarre at all, as the 
authors suggest. It’s unfortunate that the judiciary has fallen prey to this rhetoric and overstepped 
their bounds in this highly specialized area which requires deference and flexibility to support a 
vital public health interest. Yes, we need someone to separate the wheat from the chaff but the 
U.S. taxpayers should not have to foot this bill to the enormous financial benefit of the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
VI. Solutions 
The court in Caronia got it wrong. In the context of drug safety and efficacy, the public 
health must outweigh the free speech rights of drug manufacturers. The fix to the tension 
between drug manufacturer’s first amendment rights and the public’s right to freedom from harm 
lies somewhere in between full protection and complete ban.  
 A. Disclaimers 
Disclaimers are generally accepted as less restrictive ways to limit speech but fail here 
because the information which is not provided when a disclaimer is used is critical to meeting the 
statutory goals of the FDCA. 
Disclaimers have long been used in the food and drug realm to save otherwise false and 
misleading claims. Precedents exist across the board from prescription to over-the-counter drugs 
to medical devices, to nutritionals and cosmetics. The benefit of using disclaimers is that they are 
less restrictive than a complete ban on speech, but in this context they would be inadequate. A 
disclaimer stating “this drug use has not been evaluated by FDA” does not enable the doctor or 
patient to adequately weigh the benefits and risks. 
30 
 
An example where use of a disclaimer makes sense is for Neosporin Scar Solution. 
Neosporin Scar Solution is an over-the-counter medical device indicted for the treatment of 
hypertrophic and keloid scars.
132
 The FDA mandated disclaimers, “this product is not sterile and 
does not contain antibiotics”, and “do not use on open wounds or unhealed skin”, effectively 
mitigate the potential that consumers may be mislead and harmed by the name of the product.
133
 
The brand name Neosporin has long been associated with products containing the antibiotics 
neomycin, bacitracin, and polymyxin B. As such, consumers may readily believe that Neosporin 
Scar Solution has antibiotic properties and may be used on open wounds. Thus, the disclaimers 
noted above impart critical information to consumers that help them self-diagnose, self-select, 
and self-treat successfully. A disclaimer on this product which simply states, “this product has 
not been reviewed and approved by the FDA” would fail as an effective disclaimer because it 
does not impart the critical information need to use the product safely and effectively. 
B. Clinical Evidence 
Promoting on-label drug uses based on clinical evidence pursuant to an effective NDA is 
not restricted. Manufacturers can avail themselves to various types of clinical evidence to get 
their off-label claims approved and made on-label.
134
 Instead of two adequate and well-
controlled clinical studies, they can refer to peer reviewed journal articles to gain approval for 
their drugs’ off-label use.135 Although the studies described in peer review articles are typically 
not scientifically robust, and studies with negative results aren’t typically submitted for peer 
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review and publication, the FDA does accept peer review articles in support of approvals for 
additional indications of an already approved drug.
136
 FDA has historically encouraged firms to 
submit scientific evidence about new uses in supplemental applications with the aim of getting 
the approved data in the labeling where they can do most good.
137
  
The conduct of clinical studies and the process of scientific fact-finding is the backbone 
of public health protection.
138
 The need for adequate and well-controlled clinical studies of new 
drugs is evident from the long history of public health setbacks in the United States. It is 
completely unacceptable that patients should be assuming the risk of using a drug on the basis of 
deceptive promotion.
139
 Sound evidence of effectiveness is crucial to the FDA benefit versus risk 
assessment of a particular drug but what comprises evidence of effectiveness has been the 
subject of much debate. Pursuant to the Food Drug and Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, 
Congress directed the FDA to provide guidance on the “circumstances in which published matter 
may be the basis for approval of a supplemental application for a new indication, and on data 
requirements that will avoid duplication of previously submitted data by recognizing the 
availability of data previously submitted in support of an original application to support approval 
of a supplement application.”140   In short, it describes the scientific rigor needed when less than 
two adequate and well-controlled studies are conducted or available.  
The FDA  “Guidance for Industry –Providing Clinical Evidence of Effectiveness for 
Human Drugs and Biologics”, describes the qualitative and quantitative standards for supporting 
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safety and effectiveness and encourages the submission of Supplemental New Drug Applications 
(SNDAs) to add new uses to the labeling of approved drugs.
141
 It provides the scientific 
justification for the legal standard of substantial evidence.
142
 As legally defined in the FDCA, 
substantial evidence is “evidence consisting of adequate and well controlled investigations 
including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug product involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and 
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
labeling or proposed labeling thereof.”143 In this Guidance, FDA has interpreted this statutory 
requirement and described various ways to establish it.
144
 Pursuant to this Guidance, 
manufacturers have a number of options for pursuing approval of an off-label use with less than 
usual the quantity or quality of data required.
145
 
In addition, while full reports showing safety and efficacy by the sponsor are generally 
needed, the FD&C Act itself allows drugs to be approved based on less evidence.
146
 Although 
not as scientifically robust, referencing someone else’s data and published literature reports can 
support approval pursuant to a  505(b)(2) application.
147
  The 505(b)(2) Application results in a 
comprehensive summary of the data relevant to the use in the product’s labeling and gives 
doctors and their patients unbiased and objective information to weigh benefits versus risks at 
point of use via the package insert which accompanies each package of the drug. FDA accepts 
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this type of data and approves 505(b)(2) applications on a regular basis.
148
 In fact, 505(b)(2) 
applications typically comprise almost half of all applications approved each year.
149
 
 VII. Conclusion 
Off-label drug promotion must continue to be restricted. Statutory interpretation 
concludes that Congress intended for FDA to take whatever steps necessary to protect the public 
from unsafe and ineffective drugs. Off-label promotion is now constitutionally protected speech 
but its restriction survives heightened scrutiny and is thus justified. Public policy mandates that 
public health trump freedom of speech in the context of off-label drug advertising and promotion 
of drugs. Supplemental NDAs and the 505(b)(2) mechanism already provide ways for 
manufacturers to gain approval for other uses of a drug based on less than full investigations of 
safety and efficacy. Pharmaceutical manufacturers need to recognize and embrace the benefits of 
adequate, science-based, reliable information to meet their responsibility in ensuring that the 
public gets the information they need to achieve successful outcomes when using the drugs they 
promote. The appropriate way to disseminate information about off-label uses is through 
independent symposia, educational sessions, and professional meetings while manufacturers 
contemporaneously investigate the uses in scientifically driven adequate and well controlled 
studies. In this way, patients will still have access to potentially valuable off-label uses but 
harmful uses will be brought to light sooner thereby limiting their exposure to the public. 
                                                            
148 Id. 
149 CDER Drug and Biologic Approvals Reports, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Druga
ndBiologicApprovalReports/default.htm. 
 
